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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 920754-CA
Priority No. 2

TODD ROBINSON,
Defendant/Appellant

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Appendix I to this reply brief contains the full text of
the following controlling constitution and statutory provisions:
Article I, § 7, Constitution of Utah (1992 Repl. Vol.)
Article I, § 12, Constitution of Utah (1992 Repl. Vol.)
Amendment VI, U.S. Constitution (1992 Repl. Vol.)
Amendment XIV, U.S. Constitution (1992 Repl. Vol.).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(3)(c) (1992 Repl. Vol.)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(b) (1992 Repl. Vol.)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201.2(1) (1192 Repl. Vol.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

sentencing

judge

may

only

impose

as

criminal

restitution those special damages which could be recovered in a
civil action Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201(4) (b) . Therefore, the trial
judge may not impose full requested restitution when the amount of
restitution is disputed until civil defenses to recovery which are
asserted by the criminal defendant are fully litigated, either
civilly or

in a restitution

hearing.

The

sentencing

judge's

imposition

of

full

restitution

and

refusal

to

consider

Mr. Robinson's civil defense to recovery of damages was error.
The sentencing judge did not adequately consider the
statutory criterion for imposition of restitution Utah Code Ann.
§76-3-201(4) (b) (1992 as amended) . The sentencing judge must state
clearly the facts she relies upon to conclude Mr. Robinson has the
future ability to pay both the full amount of $13,567.87 and that
Mr. Robinson has the ability to pay that amount at a rate of $20.00
per month.
POINT I:

The trial Judge must consider civil issues if
it orders full restitution and the restitution
amount is disputed.
The state misconstrues Appellant's argument

brief.

in it's

Appellant is not arguing that trial judges must always

litigate all civil claims before it is able to impose restitution;
rather, the trial Judge may not impose full restitution when the
amount of restitution is in dispute until civil defenses to
recovery asserted by the defendant are fully litigated.

In

Mr. Robinson's case, the trial Judge refused to consider the civil
defense to recovery of the release of liability and yet the trial
court

imposed

full restitution despite

the existence

of the

release. There is no indication that the legislature intended for
criminal restitution to be imposed when civil recovery would be
barred.
In it's brief the state attempts to distinguish the words
"could recover", as used in the restitution statutes,

Utah Code

Ann. §76-3-201(4)(b), from the words "should recover".

The state

2

argues that if the legislature had meant for civil claims to be
fully litigated in restitution, it would have said "would" and not
"could". However, this is a distinction without substance. There
is

no

basis

to

support

the

assertion

that

the

legislature

consciously chose one word over another.
The position appellant advocates is that the trial court
impose only that restitution which is both easily measurable and
that clearly could be recoverable in a civil action; for example,
when no civil defense is presented, and leave the remaining amount
in dispute to full civil litigation and collection in accordance
with that outcome.
Any other procedure would result in automatic imposition
of the highest possible amount of restitution and the defendant
must then sue in civil court.

If the defendant receives a

favorable result in civil court then he goes back to the trial
Judge

and

attempts

to

have

criminal

restitution

altered

accordingly.
Three major problems exist with this procedure.

First,

it requires a defendant to litigate civilly, including incurring
costs of filing fees and hiring of counsel, in order to get an
accurate restitution amount in line with what would be imposed in
civil court. This requirement forced on a criminal defendant would
violate due process as well as right to counsel since counsel would
not be appointed for civil litigation if Mr. Robinson could not
afford to hire counsel. See United States Constitution, Amendment
XIV, and Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7, as well as Utah
3

Constitution,

Article

I,

Section

Constitution, Amendment VI.

12,

and

United

States

Furthermore, the legislature did not

intend this result.

In Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201(3)(c) it states

"if

objects

the

defendant

to

the

imposition,

amount,

or

distribution of restitution, the court shall, at the time of the
sentencing,

allow

him

a

full

hearing

on

the

issue".

The

legislature has created an opportunity for a defendant to be fully
heard on restitution or at least show the trial judge civil issues
exist which should limit criminal restitution.
Second,

as

a

practical

matter

a

defendant

Mr. Robinson cannot initiate a civil suit himself.
Mr. Robinson

brought

a breach

of

contract

action

like

Assuming that
against

the

Thompsons, it appears he could not introduce crucial evidence with
respect to the contract

(the release) and the i~esulting damages.

Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201.2(1) states that evidence that a defendant
has been ordered to pay restitution is not admissible in a civil
action "arising out of the facts or events which were the basis of
the restitution."

At the very least, Mr. Robinson's amount of

damages would be inadmissible in his civil action.
When the Thompsons breached the contract by seeking an
amount over what the parties agreed in the release satisfied all
claims, the resulting damage is the restitution Mr. Robinson was
ordered to pay.

Therefore, both the fact that the Thompsons sought

an amount over $400.00 in the restitution hearing as well as the
amount

Mr. Robinson

was

Mr. robinson's civil claim.

ordered

to

pay

are

crucial

to

The inadmissibility of such evidence
4

renders any civil action useless to Mr. Robinson.
civil

courts

do

not

restitution amounts.

have

jurisdiction

to

Moreover, the

affect

criminal

So if Mr. Robinson could as a practical

matter sued in civil court and prevailed in civil court he would
have to take that civil order back to the criminal trial Judge and
attempt to get restitution altered, however, the civil court cannot
force the criminal court to comply.
Third, because

of

the potential

inadmissibility

of

evidence, the only realistic way for Mr. Robinson to be heard on
his defense is to hope that the Thompsons initiate suit against him
and he can assert the breach of contract in response. However, it
is unlikely the Thompsons will invest the money and effort in a
civil action against Mr. Robinson when they are promised $13,567.87
in restitution with a jail term inevitable if Mr. Robinson wilfully
fails to pay. Furthermore, since criminal restitution obligations
are

not

releasable

by bankruptcy,

the

Thompsons

benefit

by

collecting criminally.
POINT II: The sentencing Judge must do more than recite the
restitution statute in court, she must state on the
record the facts which support her finding that
Mr. Robinson has the ability to pay restitution requested
by the State.
The state in it's brief indicates that the trial judge
read in open court the restitution statute and, therefore, the
court applied and considered the proper criteria in it's decision
to impose restitution.
Appellant's
specific

position

is that

the

court

never made

findings that Mr. Robinson has the ability
5

to pay

$13,567.87.

The court did not state on the record what information

it relied on in determining that Mr. Robinson was able to pay.

The

trial judge has a responsibility to support her findings to enable
this court to fully review the basis of her ruling.

The trial

judge found that Mr. Robinson could pay $20.00 a month toward that
figure but she did not record the information which supported that
finding.

The trial judge also did not provide the factual basis

which supported her determination that Mr. Robinson had the ability
to pay, into the future, the total amount of $13,567.87 as ordered.
Therefore, the record does not demonstrate that the trial judge
actually applied the statutory standard to the facts presented at
the hearing.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the trial court's restitution order.

DATED this /0nd

day of July, 1993.

SUSAN M. DENHARDT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, SUSAN M. DENHARDT, hereby certify that I have caused to be
served eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals
and four copies of the foregoing to the South Valley County
Attorney's Office, 2001 South State Street, Suite S3700, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111 this p?""1 day of July, 1993.

DELIVERED this

day of July, 1993.
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APPENDIX I

76-3-201

CRIMINAL CODE

CHAPTER 3
PUNISHMENTS
Section
76-3-206.
76-3-207.

Part 2
Sentencing
Section
76-3-201.

76-3-201.2.
76-3-203.1.
76-3-203.2.

76-3-203.3.

Sentences or combination of
sentences allowed — Civil
penalties — Restitution —
Definitions — Resentencing
— Aggravation or mitigation
of crimes with mandatory
sentences.
Civil action by victim for damages.
Offenses committed by three or
more persons — Enhanced
penalties.
Definitions — Use of firearm in
offenses committed on or
about school premises — Enhanced penalties.
Penalty for hate crimes — Civil
rights violation.

76-3-207.5.

Capital felony — Penalties.
Capital felony — Sentencing
proceeding.
Applicability — Effect on sentencing — Options of offenders.

Part 3
Fines and Special Sanctions
76-3-301.
Fines of persons.
Part 4
Limitations and Special Provisions on
Sentences
76-3-402.
Conviction of lower degree of offense.
76-3-404.
Presentence investigation and
diagnostic evaluation —
Commitment of defendant —
Sentencing procedure.

PART 2
SENTENCING
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Definitions —
Resentencing — Aggravation or mitigation of
crimes with mandatory sentences.
(1) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person adjudged guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(g) to death.
(2) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to
forfeit property, dissolve a corporation, suspend or cancel a license, or permit
removal of a person from office, cite for contempt, or impose any other civil
penalty. A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(3) (a) (i) When a person is adjudged guilty of criminal activity which has
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it
may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitu10

PUNISHMENTS

76-3-201

tion up to double the amount of pecuniary damages to the victim or
victims of the offense of which the defendant has pleaded guilty, is
convicted, or to the victim of any other criminal conduct admitted by
the defendant to the sentencing court unless the court in applying the
criteria in Subsection (3)(b) finds that restitution is inappropriate.
Whether the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of
the court record.
(ii) When a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title
77, Chapter 30, or has been transported at governmental expense
from one county to another within the state for the purpose of resolving pending criminal charges and is adjudged guilty of criminal activity in the county to which he has been returned, the court may, in
addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity
for the extradition or transportation. In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in Subsection
(3)(b). If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of
the court record. The court shall send a copy of its order of restitution
to the Division of Finance.
(b) In determining whether or not to order restitution, or restitution
which is complete, partial, or nominal, the court shall take into account:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of
restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
(c) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow him a full
hearing on the issue.
(4) As used in Subsection (3):
(a) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(b) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes, but is not limited to, the money equivalent of
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses such
as earnings and medical expenses.
(c) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, including insured damages.
(d) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
11

PUNISHMENTS
into consideration the sentencing guidelines
established under this section by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice" for
"comply with the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council" in the second sentence in Subsection (6)(a); and made stylistic and punctuation
changes.
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,

76-3-201.2

1992, added Subsections (l)(e) and (f) and redesignated former Subsection (l)(e) as (l)(g);
subdivided Subsection (4)(d); substituted
"takes precedence over" for "supersedes" in
Subsection (6)(c); and made stylistic changes
throughout the section.
Cross-References. — Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice, § 63-25-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ings on the questions of restitution and responsibility for attorney fees, together with such
additional proceedings as might be necessary
to permit the making of adequate findings,
where there was no record to demonstrate compliance with Subsection (3)(b). State v. Hasten,
811 P.2d 929 (Utah 1991).

ANALYSIS

Aggravating factors.
—Severity of offense.
Restitution.
—Findings.
Review.
Statement of reasons for sentence.
Aggravating factors.
—Severity of offense.
When the trial judge considered the severity
of the offenses "together with" additional aggravating factors, any error in citing the severity of the offenses as an aggravating factor was
harmless. State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188 (Utah
1990).
Restitution.
—Findings.
Case was remanded for supplementary find-

Review.
A sentence will not be overturned on appeal
unless the trial court has abused its discretion.
State v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1991).
Statement of reasons for sentence.
Trial court fully complied with the procedures required by this section when it identified the mitigating and aggravating circumstances prior to sentencing, and made clear the
reason for the sentence of middle severity: the
aggravating circumstances did not outweigh
the mitigating circumstances. State v. Elm,
808 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Binding Sentencing
Guidelines: A Means of Controlling Utah's
Prison Population, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 309.

76-3-201.2. Civil action by victim for damages.
(1) Provisions in this part concerning restitution do not limit or impair the
right of a person injured by a defendant's criminal activities to sue and recover damages from the defendant in a civil action. Evidence that the defendant has paid or been ordered to pay restitution under this part or Section
77-18-1, may not be introduced in any civil action arising out of the facts or
events which were the basis for the restitution. However, the court shall
credit any restitution paid by the defendant to a victim against any judgment
in favor of the victim in the civil action.
(2) If conviction in a criminal trial necessarily decides the issue of a defendant's liability for pecuniary damages of a victim, that issue is conclusively
determined as to the defendant if it is involved in a subsequent civil action.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201.2, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 69, § 3; 1989, ch. 187, § 4; 1990, ch.
163, §§ 4, 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-

ment, amending this section as amended by L.
1989, ch. 187, effective July 1, 1990, substituted "Section 77-18-1" for "Rule 17, Utah
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Art. I, § 6

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Question in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Petitioner Is Released Prior to Final Adjudication, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265.
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscientious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328.
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Corpus §§ 5 to 7.

C J . S . — 16A CJJS. Constitutional Law
§ 472 et seq.; 39 CJ.S. Habeas Corpus § 5.
AJL.R. — Anticipatory relief in federal
courts against state criminal prosecutions
growing out of civil rights activities, 8
A.LJt3d 301.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «=»
83(1), 121 to 123.

Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms.
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.),
S.J.R. 3.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate

Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amend
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Regulation of light to bear arms.
This section gives sufficient authority for the
legislature to forbid the possession of dangerous weapons by those who are not citizens, or
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incompetent. State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah
1974).

ANALYSIS

Prospective application.
Regulation of right to bear arms.
Prospective application.
The amendment to this provision by Laws
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3
is to be given prospective application only.
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?,
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons
and Firearms § 4.
C J . S . — 16A CJ.S. Constitutional Law
§ 511; 94 CJ.S. Weapons § 2.

AX.R. — Gun control laws, validity and
construction of, 28 A.L.R.3d 845.
Validity of statute proscribing possession or
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law *» 82;
Weapons <*=» 1, 3, 6 et seq.

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
History: Const 1896.
Cross-References. — Eminent domain generally, § 78-34-1 et seq.

64

Art. I, § 12

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Workmen's Compensation Act is not invalid
because it delegates to industnal commission
the power to hear, consider and determine controversies between litigants as to ultimate liability, or their property rights. Utah Fuel Co.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 246,194 P. 122
(1920).
Dependents of employee killed by acts of
third party, a stranger to employment, are not

limited to recovery under Workmen's Compensation Act exclusively, unless they have assigned their rights to insurance carrier. Robinson v. Union Pac. R.R., 70 Utah 441, 261 P. 9
(1927).
Cited in Wrolstad v. Industrial Comm'n, 786
P.2d 243 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — No-Fault Automobile
Insurance in Utah — State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah L. Rev. 248.
Comment, The Defense of Entrapment: Next
Move — Due Process? 1971 Utah L. Rev. 266.
Comment, The Scope of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process: Counsel in Prison Disciplinary Proceedings, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 275.
Comment, The Utah Supreme Court and the
Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev.
319.
Outdoor Sports and Torts: An Analysis of
Utah's Recreational Use Act, 1988 Utah L.
Rev. 47.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1990
Utah L. Rev. 129.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law §§ 613 to 617.
C.J.S. — 16D C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§§ 1428 to 1437.
AX.R. — Exclusion of public from state

criminal trial in order to preserve confidentiality of undercover witness, 54 A.L.R.4th 1156.
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial
in order to prevent disturbance by spectators or
defendant, 55 A.L.R.4th 1170.
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial
in order to avoid intimidation of witness, 55
AJLJUth 1196.
False light invasion of privacy—defenses
and remedies, 57 A.L.R.4th 244.
Imputation of criminal, abnormal, or otherwise offensive sexual attitude or behavior as
defamation—post-New York Times cases, 57
A.L.R.4th 404.
Libel or slander defamation by statement
made in jest, 57 A.L.R.4th 520.
Defamation: designation as scab, 65
A.L.R.4th 1000.
Intentional spoliation of evidence, interfering with prospective civil action, as actionable,
70 A.L.R.4th 984.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law
*» 322, 324, 327, 328.

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
History: Const 1896.
Cross-References. — Rights of defendants,
statutory provisions, § 77-1-6.

86

Amend. V

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENT VII
[Trial by jury in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

AMENDMENT VIII
[Bail — Punishment.]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive lines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.

20

AMENDMENTS

Amend. XIV, § 3

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.
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